

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THIRTIETH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 3 May 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. HASSAN

(United Arab Republic)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELLO-FRANCO

Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS

Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO

Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Mr. N. MINTCHEV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON

U Aye LWIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. J.F.M. BELL

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. E. PEPICH

Mr. J. BUCEK

Ethiopia:

Mr. P. SAHLOU

Mr. M. HAMID

Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. C.K. GAIROLA

Mr. G.D. COMAR

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAGIATI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADIJLA NEEVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. D. GONZALES

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTA
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. M. BIEN
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. C. SANDRU
Mr. E. GLASER

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG
Mr. G.A. WESTRING
Mr. H. BLIX

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. V.N. ZHEREBTSOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. A. El-ERIAN
Mr. M.S. AHMED
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. J.H. LAMBERT
Mr. J.S.H. SHATTOCK

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. V. BAKER
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations: U THANT

Special Representative of the Acting
Secretary-General

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Acting Secretary-General

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): I declare open the thirtieth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before calling on the first speaker, I should like to say how happy we are to welcome the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, to this meeting of the Conference. We are aware that he has an extremely heavy schedule for his short stay in Geneva and it will not be possible for him to remain with us for long. I should, however, like to express to him our appreciation of the fact that he is able to spend even a short time with us, and I now call on him to make a few remarks.

The ACTING SECRETARY-GENERAL: It is a genuine pleasure for me to be present with you today, if only for a few moments, to bring you my greetings and best wishes for your success. I only wish that it were possible for me to attend more of your meetings, but I am sure that you appreciate the reasons which prevent me from doing so. I have, of course, been following your work with close attention and with great interest. I need hardly stress to members of this Conference the great, even vital, importance to all nations and all people of your labours here, and I am sure you all approach your tasks with a sense of responsibility to the entire international community.

The proceedings of this Conference represent a significant improvement over previous disarmament conferences. Thus the establishment of the co-Chairmanship is a noteworthy development which provides an effective means for continuing the bilateral negotiations of your co-Chairmen, who can thus provide substantive as well as procedural direction for your work. Apart from this, the presence of the non-aligned States in your midst is not only a recognition of this wider responsibility to which I referred earlier, but also enables them to exercise on a permanent basis their catalytic and moderating influences in helping to achieve agreement among you.

No previous disarmament conference has been so well equipped as regards, at least, the constitutional side of its work. It is, of course, a matter of the profoundest regret and concern to everyone that you have not been able thus far to reach agreement on a treaty for the effective cessation of nuclear weapon tests. But the world will find some hope in the fact that you are persisting undiscouraged in your efforts to reach such an agreement, and that the joint memorandum of the non-aligned States has been accepted by the nuclear Powers as a basis, if not the exclusive one, for continuing your negotiations.

(The Acting Secretary-General)

It is a matter of gratification that in the field of disarmament there have been submitted for your consideration two documents setting forth comprehensive programmes for total world disarmament -- the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control (ENDC/2), and the United States outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world (ENDC/30 and Corr.1). During the seven weeks you have been in session at this initial stage of your work you have been able to survey a considerable area of the difficult terrain you must traverse. It is understandable that in the short time available to you for dealing with a subject of such vast scope it may not have been possible to make a great deal of headway in achieving agreement on the substance of the problem. What is important, however, is the evident seriousness, persistence and patience with which you have undertaken your complex task, and the cordial atmosphere which has characterized your discussions. It is encouraging to know that the members of this Conference have also stated their intention to pursue their consideration of the problem with determination and the desire to find a solution.

All of you know, I am sure, the great interest which all the Members of the United Nations have in your work. It is a matter of satisfaction that your consideration of the interrelated problems of general and complete disarmament and the maintenance of peace recognizes the essential and indispensable role of the United Nations.

I am happy to have had this opportunity to offer you my sincere good wishes and earnest hopes for your success.

The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): I am sure I am expressing the feeling of all members of the Conference in thanking the Acting Secretary-General for his observations and his words of encouragement to the Conference in its work.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): On behalf of the Canadian delegation we should like to echo the Chairman's expression of gratitude to the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations for coming here and giving us this summary of the view which is taken, from his high position, of the proceedings of this Conference to date, and for his words of encouragement and inspiration to continue in our task.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Yesterday we had a discussion which ranged over a considerable area and related to the provisions for disarmament in the first stages of the United States and the Soviet Union plans, respectively; and it was agreed at the close of the meeting that we should continue today discussion of the same subject. The Canadian delegation would like to put forward some thoughts and ask some questions arising out of our study of the plans put forward by the two sides.

Our delegation is of the opinion that the most important difference between the United States and the Soviet Union plans for disarmament, as revealed in the draft treaties they have placed before the Committee, lies in the respective provisions for the reduction and elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons. This is a difference which must be resolved if we are to have general and complete disarmament. It therefore becomes the most urgent task of this Committee to explore these differences fully, examine the viewpoints and difficulties of each side, and compare possible solutions, if we are to make serious progress in our principal task of drafting an agreement.

Today we feel it necessary to put forward a number of questions in regard to the Soviet Union proposal for the elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons in the first stage of disarmament as they are set forth in articles 5 to 8 inclusive of the Soviet Union draft treaty.

At our twenty-sixth meeting held on 24 April I made some general observations (page 14) on the Soviet conception of disarmament control as it was revealed by the representative of the Soviet Union in his statement at our twenty-first meeting. I then said that the principle which the Soviet Union had been advocating, which is expressed simply by the phrase "control over disarmament only", is not compatible with the necessity to give all parties to the disarmament treaty, and the world generally, the assurance that all are fulfilling their obligations in some of the vital sectors of the disarmament process, and of course the most vital of these sectors **is** that which relates to eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

In my speech I referred to Mr. Khrushchev's statement that -

"The Soviet Union is prepared to adopt any proposal on control over disarmament that the Western Powers may put forward, if they will accept the Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament".

(ENDC/PV.21, page 27)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

I said at that time (ENDC/PV.26, page 16) that there were at least three possible interpretations of this statement. As yet, we have not been told by Mr. Zorin which of the three I suggested was the correct one or, if none of them was correct, what the real interpretation should be. However, for the present I shall assume that the meaning is that if the West accepted a given measure of disarmament contained in the Soviet plan, the Soviet Union would accept whatever control provisions attached to those measures the Western Powers would propose.

So let us examine in that light the problem of verification of the Soviet Union proposals for eliminating nuclear weapon vehicles. We note that in article 2, paragraph 5, of the Soviet draft treaty it is stated that:

"The States parties to the treaty shall in good time submit to the international disarmament organization such information about their armed forces, armaments, military production and military appropriations as are necessary to carry out the measures of the corresponding stage." (ENDC/2, page 4)

In connexion with the proposed abolition of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons, as envisaged in the Soviet plan, this naturally will be taken to mean that the parties to the treaty will at the appropriate time give complete information about their various means of delivery of nuclear weapons, such as rockets, aircraft, artillery, submarines, and so forth -- information which would be required for 100 per cent elimination of these armaments.

Article 5, paragraph 3, of the Soviet Union draft treaty reads:

"Inspectors of the international disarmament organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to above in paragraphs 1 and 2." (ENDC/2, page 6)

Paragraphs 1 and 2, of course, refer to the elimination of nuclear-weapon-carrying rockets and all their related facilities and equipment, and the stopping of their manufacture.

Articles 6, 7 and 8 apply respectively to the elimination of military aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, the elimination of naval vessels and submarines capable of discharging nuclear weapons, and the elimination of artillery capable of firing nuclear shells. Each of these articles has a paragraph 3 referring to the duties of the inspectors of the international disarmament organization and using the same language as I have quoted.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

I think it must be admitted that these paragraphs, which state the duty of the international disarmament organization in controlling the measures proposed in articles 5 to 8 inclusive, are general in the extreme. I am sure that the representative of the Soviet Union and our other colleagues on the Committee will understand the necessity for a fuller explanation of how the complete elimination of all these means of delivery of nuclear weapons is to be organized, carried out and verified. I repeat that the Canadian delegation feels that this problem of eliminating nuclear weapon vehicles, which the Soviet Union draft treaty and the United States draft treaty propose to solve in different manners, is probably the crucial problem of disarmament. It is crucial to have some agreement upon it if we expect to move forward in regard to many provisions which must be included in the draft treaty that we are endeavouring to prepare.

The Canadian delegation finds it very difficult to conceive how the Soviet Union proposes to have the 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapons vehicles carried out in one and a quarter years and controlled in a manner which will satisfy all the parties to the treaty, and the world generally, that in fact all means of delivering nuclear weapons have been eliminated and that none of them is being retained anywhere. In this connexion I must again refer to the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union at the twenty-first meeting which I quoted at the twenty-sixth meeting:

"We are not prepared to take anyone at their word ... We ourselves do not ask that we should be taken at our word."

(ENDC/PV.21, page 27)

It is therefore necessary to be completely specific and concrete about the methods to be used to prove to both of the great Power blocs, and to all the world, that each and every disarmament measure which is agreed to and which is supposed to be put into execution is actually being carried out in good faith by both sides, without the need to depend on any party's good faith or unverified assurances.

Now let us try to understand how the Soviet Union is going to convince the West, and how the West is going to convince the Soviet Union, that all inter-continental ballistic missiles, intermediate-range ballistic missiles and other means of delivery of nuclear weapons will be destroyed at a given time. We can understand the concern of the Soviet Union, that until there is some guarantee

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

that the West is actually in the process of abolishing its nuclear carriers, the international disarmament organization should not put into effect control measures of a kind which would give the West full information on the location of all the Soviet Union's ballistic-missile sites and other bases for delivery systems which would lay the Soviet Union open to surprise attack. On the other hand, the location of a large proportion of the nuclear carriers on which the West relies as a deterrent is public knowledge, so the West may be said to be already subject to the danger of a surprise attack on its deterrent capability by inter-continental ballistic missiles.

The Soviet Union must, of course, realize that the secrecy which it maintains as to the location and all other details of its nuclear striking force obliges the West to contemplate the possibility that the Soviet Union force could be used in a surprise attack.

The Soviet draft treaty, articles 5 to 8, proposes that the manufacture or fabrication of all the means of delivery of nuclear weapons shall be discontinued in the first stage, and it would appear that it is intended that the inspectors of the international disarmament organization should establish themselves at the factories and shipyards, and so forth, to ensure that production actually does cease. What happens next, in order to carry out and verify the destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons? From some previous Soviet statements on the subject one would get the impression that it is contemplated that the parties to the treaty who possessed military equipment which could deliver a nuclear weapon would provide the international disarmament organization with full information concerning this equipment and the location of their respective airfields, launching sites or bases, in order that the inspectors of the international disarmament organization could proceed there to verify their destruction. And presumably, after the inspectors had arrived at the sites and checked the equipment against the information provided, the next action to be desired would be that all nuclear weapons should be destroyed simultaneously, under the control of the inspectors. But in fact such destruction or dismantling would take a considerable time -- certainly it could not be instantaneous.

So now we come to a major difficulty: when the international disarmament organization has been notified that all nuclear weapons vehicles are at specified sites, how is the West to know that other rockets or other delivery vehicles are

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not hidden somewhere in the great spaces of the Soviet Union? And how is the Soviet Union to know that a number of delivery vehicles which belong to the Western Powers are not concealed somewhere? Would the Soviet Union be willing to let international inspectors visit every part of its territory to ensure that nothing existed outside of the declared sites; and, if so, when would this be done? Obviously the inspection of all territory to determine that nothing is concealed must precede, and not follow, the destruction of these nuclear weapons; otherwise one side might pretend to collect and destroy all its nuclear vehicles while hiding a sufficient number of them in uninspected territory; and if the other side honestly collected and destroyed all its nuclear vehicles it would find itself at a considerable military disadvantage -- to put it in the mildest possible language.

Inspection of territory other than the declared bases or centres of assembly for destruction cannot be simultaneous with destruction, because such wide-reaching inspection would take time. Therefore the territory must be inspected before the reduction of the nuclear weapon delivery capability below the level of deterrent which now exists, or which would exist after the reduction.

It might also be mentioned that the inspection for hidden missiles and nuclear war-heads should probably extend over the territory of adjacent States; because it must be remembered that after the First World War Germany evaded some of the disarmament restrictions by transferring manufacture to other States. If all Soviet nuclear vehicles were at locations known to the international disarmament organization, and hence known to the West, would this not create the situation which the Soviet Union professes to fear -- that is, the West's being in possession of intelligence which would enable it to carry out a surprise nuclear assault to destroy the Soviet Union's nuclear deterrent capacity? How could the Soviet Union accept such a condition? This would seem, to the Canadian delegation at any rate, to be an insuperable obstacle to the Soviet plan for the destruction of all carriers in the first stage. It would seem to make it necessary instead to plan for a programme of more gradual reduction and elimination, such as is contained in the United States draft treaty, which would enable the agreed principles of maintaining security and balance between the Powers as disarmament proceeded to be applied.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

There is another objection to complete elimination of nuclear weapons vehicles in the first stage. Even if the difficulties which I have cited could be overcome -- and we should like to hear a very clear explanation of how they could be overcome -- there would remain the problem of ensuring that nuclear weapons which still existed could not be delivered by some improvised means. Under the Soviet plan no nuclear weapons are eliminated until the second stage, nor are they all eliminated under the United States plan until after the second stage. I would remind our colleagues that rockets built for purposes of scientific exploration of space would remain in existence and that it would be possible to fit war-heads into these. A number of aircraft not specifically designed for carrying nuclear weapons would remain, and we all know that the first atomic bombs were dropped by a conventional bomber which had been converted for the purpose. There would even be the possibility of converting civil transport aircraft to carry nuclear bombs, though doubtless such converted aircraft would be of limited efficiency. In other words, the nuclear threat would remain even if the Soviet proposals for the elimination of all nuclear weapons vehicles now known to be specifically designed for the purpose were possible of implementation.

Would any nation which now possesses nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them wish to eliminate all of its means of retaliation -- the deterrent upon which it now primarily relies to prevent the actual use or threat of use of nuclear weapons? Would it wish to dispose of all these in the early stages, when there were still very many nuclear weapons in existence and when confidence in good intentions in regard to disarmament and the creating of a peaceful world had yet to be established and consolidated?

It seems to me that this is another very strong argument, and perhaps the decisive argument, for the reduction and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles to take place by stages and to be final and complete in the last stage of disarmament.

I hope that the representative of the Soviet Union will consider carefully the questions I have posed and the arguments I have advanced. I hope also that he will give clear and detailed answers to the questions at an early date and explain what the Soviet Union has in mind in order to overcome the difficulties I have cited.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Canada is not a nuclear Power; nor are the majority of the members of this Committee; but we all realize the vital importance of establishing with all clarity what the problem of eliminating nuclear vehicles really is and of exploring the proposals for a solution which must conform to the agreed principles of balance and effective international control. At this stage in our negotiations we may not be able to find an answer to this problem which can be accepted by all the nuclear Powers and their allies. But we can and we must face the issue squarely, realizing that agreement on this point is the prime essential if the whole programme of general and complete disarmament is to become a reality.

Mr. LALL (India): Since yesterday our consideration of this matter has entered a new phase: the phase of substantive measures contained in the first stage of the two programmes of disarmament which are before us. The delegation of India is glad that we have made this step in our consideration and we are conscious of the fact that, as the first of the eight non-aligned countries to speak, we have undertaken to do something that will be justified only if it helps to bring the two main parties closer together. I recall the wise and correct words which we have heard today from the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant -- that is, that these eight countries could play a catalytic and moderating role. It is that sort of approach that we hope to bring to bear in making a few remarks today.

In this connexion I should like to note first of all that the tone of the speeches since we began yesterday morning this stage of our consideration will be helpful in taking us forward. Mr. Godber started us off in this way by speaking very thoughtfully and calmly about our subject, and I feel that that has helped us throughout the debate that has ensued.

I should like to note that there seems to be agreement on one quite important matter relating to a procedural aspect of our work. Mr. Godber yesterday quoted from remarks by Mr. Krishna Menon regarding the setting up of more informal forums of work (ENDC/PV.3, pages 22 et seq.) That indeed is our position. In fact today, though we are in plenary meeting, many of the ideas which we will express I should like to be regarded as ideas expressed informally, expressed with a view to trying to bring about a rapprochement and, therefore, not to be taken as definitive or finalized proposals so much as suggestions for the consideration of those primarily involved. We feel it would assist this process if we could fairly soon embark upon more informal meetings.

(Mr. Lall, India)

I was glad to see that Mr. Zorin -- and I believe he spoke in his capacity not only as representative of the Soviet Union but as a co-Chairmen of our Committee -- favoured the idea of more informal meetings. In fact I should quote him correctly -- though I am speaking from memory, I must remember that Mr. Zorin sometimes chooses very cautious phrases, even when he is wholly in agreement with something; he said that the Soviet Union would not exclude the possibility of informal meetings (ENDC/PV.29, page 32). I must say that I took that to mean that he would agree to informal meetings. I hope I am not putting too much meaning into his statement that he would not exclude such arrangements.

These informal meetings will be really important. They will be really important particularly, if I may say so, to the eight countries which are not involved in the military arrangements which affect some members of this Committee -- because many of us want to contribute by questions, by general ideas, by trying to help in the building of bridges, and we feel that that will be something we can best do in an informal context. When we are able to do that, then I feel that what Mr. Godber said yesterday will prove to be true, namely:

"... The draft treaty that emerges will not be a Soviet draft, it will not be a United States draft; it will be a draft of the nations taking part in this Conference." (ENDC/PV.29, page 6)

The representative of Italy also drew attention to this point, that the draft which emerges must be the draft of the whole Conference. Our endeavour will be of course to further the process of getting a draft which is representative of the views of the members of this Committee.

I now turn to the question of timing: the time limit which is essential for a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Here too I should like to point out that there is a certain amount of coming together. A time limit is of course essential; otherwise our obligations would be blurred. Speaking here on 20 March, Mr. Krishna Menon, the leader of the Indian delegation, drew attention to the fact that when Prime Minister Nehru had spoken at the United Nations two years ago he had said:

"It is a question of trying to achieve it not all in one fine morning or in one piece, but as one piece with so many stages within it for the accomplishment of the whole thing in a short period of four or five years." (ENDC/PV.5, page 20)

(Mr. Lall, India)

That quotation, I believe, fits in with the quotation from a more recent statement by Prime Minister Nehru to which Mr. Godber drew attention yesterday (ENDC/PV.29, page 10). Anyway, we think that that is how the plan should move forward.

The Soviet Union has suggested a four-year period. I should like to point out that yesterday Mr. Godber made some very important remarks with reference to the timing contained in the plan. He said:

"Some idea of how long the disarmament process is going to take is clearly indispensable, for without it obligations to disarm would be meaningless." (ENDC/PV.29, page 6)

The United States plan is still a little unclear about the total length of a disarmament programme, but I take this to be only a temporary aspect of the plan. In other words, I take it that the United States will soon be in a position to formulate, and to inform us of, the total period which it has in mind for the plan.

It has been suggested in some of the interventions we have heard that gradualness in disarmament is in itself a virtue. So far as we are concerned, we would agree that haste is not a virtue: what is required is careful consideration and examination of the alternative ideas which have been presented in the two plans and, indeed, of other ideas; in drafting our treaty we must be most cautious. I would like to point out that there has already been a great deal of gradualness in our consideration of disarmament. We have been considering disarmament in a most cautious manner for ten or fifteen years. We must not lose sight of that element. No one wants to rush forward, but have we really been rushing forward when we have been engaged in the preliminary stages for fifteen years? Is it not time that the great threat which has developed to our whole world should be eliminated? Is it not time that we should think in terms of positive steps to achieve fairly quickly our goal of a world free from the threat of destruction? I would submit that we have been as gradual as we can afford to be in our consideration of the problem of disarmament. We have tempted the goddess of tragedy long enough -- in fact, too long. The risks of going on delaying are very great indeed.

This is a point which must be remembered. It is not today that we have started the consideration of disarmament. It is not that the world is for the first time today on the threshold of dangerous armament. The world has

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unfortunately achieved a stage of preparedness in destruction which is staggering and which could eliminate not only our own planet but also, if the new rockets were soon to achieve the possibility of visiting Mars or Venus, or whatever other planets were within their reach, those planets as well. Therefore, when we talk of gradualness, let us bear in mind the years that have gone by so far in unachieved disarmament and the fact that the situation which we face is urgent and grave.

In our view, not only are there these dangers which have accumulated in our world and which necessitate our moving forward now with a respectful and responsible sense of urgency, but there are positive advantages in having a fair amount of speed in a disarmament programme. For one thing, once we started a disarmament programme which was moving forward fairly rapidly, it would be very difficult to set the clock back, it would be very difficult to reverse the process of disarmament. On the other hand, if the process of disarmament were laggard, slow and tentative, it would be much easier to set the clock back, to arrest a slow process. It is a law of physics, is it not, that mass into velocity is momentum? What we want is sufficient momentum to avoid stopping the process when it begins to go forward. We feel, therefore, that the process must be one which gathers momentum. Embarking too tentatively on the process of disarmament would be as unpractical, in our view, as learning to swim by putting one foot into the water one day and the other foot into the water the next day, and so on, gradually. That is not the way we are likely to solve the problem of disarmament.

In this connexion my delegation believes that there was another helpful piece of information in Mr. Godber's statement yesterday. Speaking of the three-year period suggested for stage I in the United States treaty outline, he said:

"If it can be shown that this can be done effectively in a shorter period than the three years laid down in the United States plan, then I for one support it" (ENDC/PV.29, page 9)

He went on to say:

"I would approach in the same way the time limits for the second and third stages." (ibid.10).

(Mr. Lall, India)

This is excellent news. We take this to indicate that even in the United States plan, with which I believe the allies of the United States have been associated, the period of three years for the first stage is not so far a fixed period, but one which can be reconsidered. We are very glad to learn this. This would seem to indicate -- and this is a point I would like to make -- that in the issue of timing also we can hope to come closer together.

I would now like to turn to a few matters of substance, mainly in stage I, and to make a few remarks about the force levels which are indicated in the two plans for stage I. The Soviet plan suggests that the force levels should be reduced to 1.7 million for the United States and the Soviet Union, and that armaments for anything above that figure should be destroyed and the men demobilized. The United States suggests a level of 2.1 million for the United States and the Soviet Union and an accompanying 30 per cent cut in armaments all round. Here too, apparently, there is some flexibility which might yield interesting results. Again, Mr. Godber said yesterday:

"I would only say here that in modern warfare it is the armaments that are decisive rather than the number of men, and of course men who have been disbanded can always be called up again whereas armaments that have been actually destroyed cannot so easily be replaced." (ENDC/PV.29, page 9)

I of course entirely agree with Mr. Godber about the importance of armaments. I also agree with his implication that the number of men is not that important. Well, if the number of men is not that important, then surely there should not be any great difficulty in finding agreement between the figure of 2.1 million and the figure of 1.7 million. Perhaps as a compromise, if they would excuse my calling it that, both sides could agree to come down to 1.5 million, instead of one adhering to 1.7 million and the other to 2.1 million. Mr. Godber has said, and he speaks with authority, that the number of men is not important. I hope, then, that they will come down to the figure of 1.5 million. Perhaps this is a peculiar kind of compromise, but it is the kind of compromise which I feel fits in with the implications of Mr. Godber's statement. In any event, there is room for flexibility if the figures are not that important, and we are glad to take note of that fact.

(Mr. Lall, India)

May I come now to the important question of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons? Here, too, I would like to draw attention to a previous statement made by Mr. Dean, the representative of the United States, which, though he made it in the context of defending the 30 per cent cut envisaged in the United States plan, indicates in my view the possibility of some flexibility in principle. I believe that Mr. Zorin drew attention to part of this statement. I would like to quote the whole paragraph, as I think it is a most important one:

"I fully understand the desire of all of us to deal with the danger posed by nuclear weapons delivery vehicles; it is these nuclear weapons delivery vehicles which, more than any others, have created a new condition in the world so that general war could place our civilization, as we now know it, in serious jeopardy. It is these armaments which have radically altered all concepts of national power, and altered them to a degree and in ways which we are only beginning to appreciate and understand. It is these nuclear weapons delivery vehicles which, more than any other devices, make necessary our quest for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world." (ENDC/PV.26, page 11)

Is there not implied in those remarks a sense of priority regarding these weapons? Has not Mr. Dean said about them that they, "more than any other devices, make necessary our quest"?

It seems to me, therefore, that both sides -- if I may again use that expression -- realize the intrinsic importance of dealing with this particular issue of vehicles for delivering nuclear weapons. If this matter is so important, so urgent, so crucial, so much at the heart of our quest for disarmament, surely we can find some generally-acceptable way of dealing with this issue.

I agree with Mr. Burns that questions of control will be particularly important in this connexion. In fact, I believe that Mr. Zorin conceded that point in a general sense yesterday. I cannot lay my hand on his exact words at the moment, but he said that he agreed with Mr. Dean that these weapons were of crucial importance to national security. Therefore, I submit, the controls involved would obviously be important.

Now to begin with there is one proposal of a 30 per cent cut, and there is the other proposal of total elimination, but, in the light of the remarks by the representative of the United States which I have just quoted, there appears to be a possibility of further consideration of this particular matter.

(Mr. Lall, India)

I must say that, so far as we are concerned, the Soviet proposal of the full elimination of the means of delivery as early as possible is an attractive one in its objectives. Of course we fully realize that the possibility of its early implementation will depend upon other things. It will depend upon a balanced plan. It will depend upon how precisely it will be possible for countries to show that they are in fact entering upon the destruction of all their vehicles of delivery. That was the essence of one of the points made by the representative of Canada today. Obviously, if all vehicles of delivery are to be destroyed in the first stage -- which in principle is desirable -- then the onus of establishing that the destruction is 100 per cent and not 99.9 per cent rests on the countries in which the destruction is to take place. That is entirely the case. As to what should be done about civil aircraft, Boeing-707's, Tu-114's and 104's, as to whether they might be carrying bombs and so on, we shall have to look at that question and I am sure we will be able to answer it satisfactorily.

The point, however, really is that all the established and feasible means of delivery for these weapons would have to be effectively destroyed under supervision. Presumably the Soviet Union would agree with that position, and I am sure the Soviet Union would see the importance of establishing absolutely clearly, to the satisfaction of all of us, that that kind of destruction under effective control would be undertaken. If that could be done, a very important step would be achieved, because I take it that some of the objections which have been voiced today by the representative of Canada relate precisely to this matter of whether or not it is practical to destroy these weapons fully.

Of course he raised other points, the balance of the programme and so on. We agree that there should be a balanced programme, but personally I do not think that a balanced programme necessarily involves a straight-line cut of 10 per cent or 60 per cent or 70 per cent. This is not necessarily consistent with paragraph 5 of the Agreed Principles, in which it is laid down that the cuts are to be balanced so that no country may be in a position of military advantage. That is the raison d'être of the balance of progress in the disarmament plan.

The disarmament plan can obviously therefore include various measures, some cuts, some eliminations and so on -- I shall come back to this matter a little later -- and the final result must be that disarmament proceeds in a balanced way.

(Mr. Lall, India)

Now I would like to turn to the question of peace-keeping arrangements. This is an important point, and I think the impression exists that there is some difference of point of view between the two sides. Of course there is. But is the difference in point of view as large as one might imagine? I think the representative of Italy said that he had detected a somewhat negative approach to this matter in the Soviet plan. Fortunately for us, Mr. Gromyko made an important statement, on this Conference largely, at Moscow on 24 April, and his statement was distributed to us in Conference document ENDC/34 of 25 April. In that statement Mr. Gromyko said something very interesting, and I will leave it to the Conference to decide whether this is a negative approach to a United Nations peace-keeping force. He said:

"... the Soviet Government has provided in its draft treaty for the setting up under the United Nations of an international force ..."

(ENDC/34, page 4)

I will not read any more, but nothing that follows detracts from the sense of those words. In my opinion this is not a negative position; I think it is a position which is not distant from that of the other side; and I think it is a position which indicates that on this important issue of peace-keeping arrangements the two sides can come together. That is the essential point, and it is a point the delegation of India would like to stress. We feel that this matter of peace-keeping arrangements, to which I will return in a moment, is also moving in the right direction in the two plans. Indeed, I would add here that if one studies the three or four references to this matter in stages 1, 2 and 3 of the Soviet plan one sees there is a certain movement, and I think the stage 3 provisions in this connexion are wider than has been generally admitted in our discussions. Perhaps that is so simply because the burgeoning of this idea comes in stage 3 and the remarks that have been made so far have been directed mainly to stage 1 of the plan. However, we leave it at that and draw attention again to the remarks on this matter which Mr. Gromyko made very recently in Moscow.

Now I would like to say something about the problem of control, inspection or verification, which is of course an extremely important part of our whole consideration of general and complete disarmament. It does not really matter which word one uses -- "control", "inspection" or "verification"; indeed, the

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first two of these words are for the purpose of establishing the facts, or of verifying, so we are really talking about the same thing when we use different words for this process.

First I must say that I differ somewhat from Mr. Godber in the sentiment he expressed yesterday regarding this subject. I am afraid he was rather despondent in certain of his remarks. He said:

"I do most sincerely beg of our Soviet colleagues to give some further thought to this" --

Of course, I am in entire agreement with that; I think we should all give further thought to this important matter. But this is the point I am referring to:

"... for I must say that my confidence in their will to achieve general and complete disarmament is much shaken by their attitude on this vital question of verification as displayed during the last week or two."

(ENDC/PV.29, page 16)

Perhaps I am more optimistic by nature than Mr. Godber, although I am not sure about this, because in the past I have found quite a lot of optimism in his statements and I hope we shall continue to hear optimistic remarks from him; but I must say that I am not as despondent as he is about this particular aspect of control or verification. Indeed, I would like to turn to something Mr. Zorin said yesterday on control and verification. He said:

"We cannot be satisfied with fictitious control; we are in favour of effective control and intend to ensure it.

"A serious approach to the question of control necessitates taking into account the whole military and political situation and the relations existing among States: that is to say, whether there is the necessary degree of confidence among them or not."

(ENDC/PV.29, page 36)

These words do not fill me with despondency; on the contrary, I think they show again that the objective of effective control, strict control -- these are some of the words which are used in this context by both sides -- can be achieved. We feel that in essence both sides accept the idea that there must be strict and effective control, and we are glad that is the case because it is undoubtedly that sort of control which will have to accompany disarmament measures.

(Mr. Lall, India)

There is a key paragraph in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, paragraph 6 (ENDC/5, pages 2-3), and Mr. Dean quoted it in his statement yesterday. I will quote from Mr. Dean's statement so that we have it exactly as he said it:

"... the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage."

I should like to repeat one phrase:

"... depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage."

I repeated that part of the sentence because, while I do not wish to enter into any argument with the United States about the interpretation of this principle, or rather its re-statement which Mr. Dean quoted from the United States plan (ENDC/30, page 13), I should like to say that one can, I think, quite honestly interpret paragraph 6 slightly differently. I do not wish to detract from the United States interpretation; certainly the United States is fully entitled to make the kind of re-statement it does make on page 13 of its plan. We do not wish to go into the theory, as it were, into the question of the legal interpretation of that paragraph of the Agreed Principles. In our view it is important that the plan of control accompanying disarmament should be practical and should be sufficient in the context concerned.

Then there is another important point which is a guide-line and which has not, I believe, been given sufficient attention in our discussions. The control or verification measures must be adequate in the context of the agreed movement or degree of shift of the context itself -- in other words, the control or verification measures which will be applied will not be applied to a static situation; the situation will be in the process of movement and the control measures must move side by side with the movement of the disarmament measures. One measure will be linked to the next in our disarmament plan, so that the control in stage I in respect of, say, measure A must also be determined to a certain extent by what will happen, and how soon, to that particular issue in stage II.

In the sense of a satisfactorily advancing control system, the balance of advantage would seem to us to lie in a substantial momentum along the road of disarmament. This is a matter to which I have referred previously. The point

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is this: let us say we decide to eliminate 40,000 tanks in country "A" in stage 1 and we destroy 40,000 tanks or reconvert them under international control. This would not be very difficult to do; we could ask that country to assemble its 40,000 tanks for destruction in eight or ten depots of 4,000 or 5,000 tanks each and we could have relatively small teams at each depot which would encircle the depot and would then go through the tanks and remove essential parts, such as distributors, straight away and then destroy the tanks. We will go into these details later; I mention them briefly now because I do not believe they are as difficult as they are sometimes made out to be.

But the point is that if we destroy 40,000 tanks and the means to produce 40,000 tanks, and if in the next stage we destroy another 40,000 tanks and complete the destruction of tanks in that country, and if the next stage is to be embarked upon soon -- in a matter of a year or so -- then the control measures taken in stage I for the destruction of tanks need not be as severe as they would have to be if we were going to wait five years before taking the next step. If there were to be a lapse of five years or three years before the next 40,000 tanks were to be destroyed, very considerable measures would be needed to ensure that in some corner of that country, particularly if it was a large country such as the Soviet Union or Canada, six new factories were not going to be set up in a clandestine manner to manufacture much better tanks equipped with, if Mr. Godber will forgive me, Rolls-Royce engines.

Therefore this question of the control measures is, I submit, determined to some extent by the quantum of the plan and by the speed at which it moves. If it goes in a very gingerly and lackadaisical manner, then, of course, one ought to be very careful. In fact, if it goes in a very lackadaisical manner and if we have lots of controllers waiting around for the next step, who is to know in these days, but that someone might give them sedatives? They may go to sleep and the whole process of disarmament may be arrested.

Seriously, the point is this. If we proceed in a businesslike, sharp manner down the road of disarmament, then the control measures are easier to handle, and the question of what is retained is an easier question to handle. What is retained is extremely significant if we are going very slowly. What is retained is not quite so significant if stage I is followed by stage II effectively, quickly and massively. This is a very important issue. And I

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should have thought, particularly as regards those countries which historically in the process of the consideration of disarmament have laid stress on the need for effective control, that their interests in a disarmament plan would be best assured if the plan moved fast, in a forthright manner, down the road of disarmament. Then the question of retained armaments becomes less difficult.

Let me put it another way. The Soviet Union has a four-year plan of disarmament; the United States, at present, has a six-plus-year plan of disarmament. Suppose someone were now to bring out a two-year plan of disarmament. And let us not scoff at the idea of two years for disarmament. I have been told by eminent persons who know what they are saying that at the end of World War II the United States undertook much more disarmament than is included in these plans in a space of six months. Therefore, let us not scoff at the idea of a two-year plan as being physically impossible. Suppose someone drew up a two-year plan of disarmament. Do we not see that the process of disarmament would be so quick that it would be impossible to turn the clock back and that the question of retained arms would become much less significant than under a process which took many times as long as that? That is how we look at some of the general issues involved in control.

I should like to turn now to one or two other points regarding control or verification. It seems to me that another point relating to control or verification to which insufficient attention has perhaps been drawn here is the fact that a very beneficial and inevitable consequence will flow from the application of control measures almost from the very beginning. The fact of control in various countries is, we feel, bound to increase the sense of mutual confidence which will exist between the two sides -- or, to put it another way, it will lessen mutual suspicion. We believe this is very important indeed. In fact, now we have a situation where fear is dominant in the world -- fear on the two sides. We have the paradoxical situation that gigantic armaments on both sides, which normally should lead to a feeling of great strength, lead on the contrary to a feeling of enormous insecurity on both sides. Therefore, there is a domination of fear and this leads to tremendous suspicion on each side as to what the other side might be up to.

But the point I want to stress is this. As soon as the control measures come into play -- and we hope they will come into play in a fairly strong way, because we hope that the first stage will be a strong, full-blooded stage of

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disarmament, accompanied by full-blooded control measures -- confidence will begin to increase and a sense of relaxation will begin to appear on the face of our earth, particularly on the two sides, and then another fruitful possibility, it seems to me, will open up before us.

I should like to preface my remarks on that possibility by saying that it has some relevance to the suggestion of zonal inspection which the United States has made and which was defended by Mr. Godber yesterday. I should like to say straightaway that we have nothing particularly against the zonal inspection plan if it can be generally agreed. I must say it is a bit like a game of chance: one covers a country with lines and makes little squares and then someone pulls something out of a hat and says, "Ah, it will be square 'X' tomorrow." I have no objection to that. It is a little bit like a game of chance, but if it can be generally agreed we will certainly not stand in the way.

At the moment I think we have to take note of the fact that it does not seem to be finding a great deal of favour on both sides. Mr. Gromyko said things about it at Moscow on 24 April which certainly were not favourable. I do not believe that Mr. Zorin said anything favourable about it yesterday. I do not know whether others would interpret his remarks differently, but I did not hear anything favourable about this particular matter. I will say, however, that there seems to be an element of misunderstanding on the two sides about this matter, because Mr. Zorin, I believe, indicated -- and he quoted from the United States plan in this regard -- that the basic point in the United States plan relating to this issue is that the control measures should give assurance that the retained arms are not more than stated. He drew from that the logical conclusion that there would have to be controls in the whole country.

On the other hand, both Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber were at some pains to point out yesterday -- as I believe was our colleague from Italy -- that, though that would be the logical consequence, in fact the United States plan was not going as far as logic would lead the plan to go. They said that they were suggesting a selective system of zonal controls which would relate at a given time to a small proportion of the country, increasing as the plan advanced.

I have repeated these two points of view because I think that there may be some mutual misunderstanding, and we are very concerned in our delegation that misunderstandings should be cleared up and that each side should find it possible at least to understand what the other means by its plan. We do not look upon the

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zonal plan as leading inevitably to total control over the country from the very beginning. However, this is an issue which the two sides will undoubtedly discuss further between themselves. But the point I wish to make now is the one to which I drew attention a few moments ago, namely, that as controls and disarmament progress there will be a lessening of tension and suspicion together with an increase of confidence.

Should this happen, I would like to suggest, for the consideration of the two sides primarily concerned, a possible alternative to this whole idea of zonal inspection. I would like to say again that I am not making the following suggestion as a firm proposal. We have discussed it in our delegation and we feel that it might be beneficial if the two sides were to think about it. Our suggestion is that as the disarmament plan progresses it should be feasible for the two sides -- in fact, for all those engaged in disarmament -- to address to the international disarmament organization invitations to visit their countries, and to open up in this way from time to time increasingly larger areas of the countries concerned. In other words, as was done in connexion with the nuclear test ban discussions, I would like to put an onus of responsibility on each country by writing into our plan words which would indicate that it should be incumbent upon countries, in the improving situation, to see whether they would not be able to invite members of the international disarmament organization to visit increasingly larger areas.

It seems to my delegation that this would be a method of giving an added measure of security to all of us. It would be a measure of expressing in the most acceptable form the increasing confidence which we all believe would be an outcome of the development of the disarmament plan as it progressed.

I should like to point out that this arrangement we are suggesting would, of course, be in addition to the verification and control of actual destruction, elimination or reduction of various weapons and of the armed forces. All that, of course, must be done under effective control. But this is an additional measure which we believe could well flow from the increasing confidence, the lessening tension and the lessening feeling of suspicion which would undoubtedly accompany the disarmament plan. In fact, we believe in our delegation that this type of invitation would be an appropriate accompaniment to the developing plans of disarmament. It would give a human and agreeable dimension to plans which are,

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after all -- let us face it -- mechanistic, rather hard in their whole concept. But this opening out of all the countries concerned by appropriate invitation would, we feel, be something which all of us should consider in connexion with the progress of the disarmament plan.

We feel that this would be the best manner of building upon the increasing confidence which would accrue from the progress of disarmament. We should be building upon it in such a manner as to give increased assurance of security to all of us. I freely admit that in regard to invitations one may turn around and say: "Well, invitations, after all ... We will be invited to these places where there are simply green fields and steppes, and so on". But do not let us prejudge these invitations. We can write words into any treaty of the kind which will point out the significance of these invitations. They are not meant to enable us to visit green fields, pleasant though it certainly is to visit green fields. I suppose it is very pleasant to visit the wide, unpopulated spaces of North Canada, but that will not be the purpose of the invitations. The purpose of the invitations will be different. We would suggest that this idea of invitations be considered.

Before I close I should like to sound one more note. I do it because I think it might be helpful -- and for no other reason. I hope representatives will excuse me for the form in which I put this, and will remember that I am using this form illustratively for a purpose which I hope may be helpful. I would like to take note of the question of the elimination of foreign bases. What are the controls proposed? I am taking note of this issue not from the point of view of whether bases are eliminated in stages I, II or III, but only from the point of view of the controls in the two sets of proposals before us. I believe I am right in saying that, apart from the fact that bases are to be destroyed under control in situ, there is nothing indicating in detail what control measures will be required. I believe, if I may be pardoned for saying so, that our United States colleagues, who have shown a great interest in detailed controls, have not talked of detailed controls regarding the elimination of foreign bases.

I am raising this point for a very simple reason. If I were an extremely wicked person who had many foreign bases in other countries, and if my bases were destroyed in certain parts of those countries, I would quietly build up clandestine bases in other parts of these countries. There is nothing in the

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control provisions which I have seen in either plan which would prohibit me from doing so. In other words, what I am saying is that, in order to have effective destruction of foreign military bases, it would be theoretically necessary to control absolutely the whole of each country. It would be necessary not only to destroy the bases where they exist, but also to have inspectors posted all over each country, especially in all the hidden, secluded sites in that country, to see that no new bases were built.

Mr. Burns did not draw attention to this fact. He drew attention to the fact that for the destruction of certain kinds of weapons and systems there would have to be controls over the whole country. I submit that, in regard to any weapons or bases, if one wishes to be perfectionist about the control system there would have to be controls throughout a country. Yet neither plan has suggested that type of control. That is my point. Why not? Because, when we are not terribly concerned, when the shoe does not pinch too hard, we are willing to be practical about it. That is why no one has suggested this elaborate system of controls for the elimination of foreign bases: because we knew we have to be practical.

Therefore let us approach this question of controls in a practical manner. Let us not approach it in a theoretical way. We must have assurance that disarmament is proceeding, and if we proceed sufficiently fast and actively, in a forthright manner, with our disarmament plan, the question of retained weapons becomes less important. We suggest that consideration be given to our idea that, concomitant with increasing confidence between countries, there should be an opening-up of countries by a developing series of invitations from all concerned.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): We have now reached article 4 in our discussions on the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, that is, the test of the treaty which is to sum up the content of the process of disarmament in its first stage. The documents we have before us -- the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union on 15 March, and the outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world proposed by the United States Government on 18 April -- define, unfortunately in two very different ways, the content of and the measures to be taken during the first stage of the process of general and complete disarmament.

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Analyzing them we reach the conclusion that the serious divergencies which exist between them stem from the fundamental differences on what should be included in the first stage. When approaching the content of the first stage we should start from the conditions prevailing at the present historic moment. These conditions are characterized, as Mr. Lall so forcibly stressed just now, by the existence of huge stockpiles of weapons having a power of destruction unprecedented in history, creating a qualitatively new danger, the danger of a nuclear war being unleashed which would cause mankind incalculable losses. The consequence that must be drawn is that the methods used for achieving disarmament must also be qualitatively new in comparison with those examined before.

What we need are new methods which would ensure that in the shortest possible time mankind would be liberated from the nightmare of a nuclear war. What we need are radical measures, not half measures. It is necessary that determined steps be taken so that right from the very first stage the danger of a nuclear war would be removed.

A reduction of existing armaments alone cannot lead to the achievement of this aim. In this respect I think it is sufficient for me to repeat the words used by Prime Minister Nehru of India on 18 March this year:

"Today, therefore, disarmament has become a question not of reducing armament by 10 per cent, 15 per cent, 20 per cent or 25 per cent. If this basic fear remains" --

and Mr. Nehru was speaking about the fear of nuclear war being unleashed --

"it does not matter how much you reduce it, because it does not require, as figures are given, the thousands of nuclear bombs possessed by big nuclear Powers; a quarter of them are enough to wipe off the world or wipe off another country." (ENDC/PV.5, page 35)

Mr. Krishna Menon said on 20 March in this Committee:

"One can add to this that if after partial reduction there should be world conflicts with the remaining weapons all the weapons that had been thrown away would come back in six months ..." (ibid)

In the second place, the necessity of changing the present international situation so that peoples could breathe freely calls for as short a time as possible at the end of which the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war would be liquidated as soon as possible. A long term would undermine every prospect of achieving general and complete disarmament.

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The Soviet draft treaty corresponds to both requirements. It provides for the liquidation of all nuclear weapon vehicles. Article 4 of that draft defines the fundamental task of the first stage, while articles 5 to 8 give details on rockets, planes, surface warships, submarines, artillery systems and so on. These radical measures will have to be achieved within the general term for the fulfilment of the tasks incumbent to the first stage, which is one and a half years. The production of nuclear weapon vehicles will stop concurrently with the destruction of such vehicles. Suffice it to mention in this respect the provisions of article 5, paragraph 2, of the Soviet draft. Similar provisions are included in articles 6, 7 and 8 with regard to the cessation of the production of other nuclear weapon vehicles.

The Soviet draft has the special merit of solving one of the greatest difficulties raised in the path of achieving general and complete disarmament: that of control. Indeed, as long as States have the right to possess and produce the means of delivering nuclear weapons to their target, the problem of control over the observance of obligations to destroy only part of these means creates serious difficulties. The circles interested in obtaining military information for purposes which have nothing to do with disarmament will try to turn control over these measures of disarmament into control over armaments, a control which is unacceptable to peace-loving States. If, however, all nuclear weapon vehicles are destroyed and their production stopped, the problem of control will no longer present difficulties.

The joint Soviet-United States statement of agreed principles on disarmament, endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly, envisages in point 5 that:

"All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all." (ENDC/5, page 2)

This principle, whose importance for the achievement of general and complete disarmament is obvious, calls for the liquidation of foreign military bases alongside and simultaneously with the destruction of nuclear weapons vehicles. It is indeed well known that, while the Soviet Union has at its disposal the most up-to-date means for delivering nuclear weapons to their target, the United States of America and a number of States which are its associates within some

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military groupings have the possibility of attacking the socialist States from military bases situated thousands of kilometres away from their own territory and in the immediate vicinity of the Soviet Union or of other socialist States.

In order to maintain a balance and to respect to an equal extent the security of all parties concerned it is therefore necessary that, alongside the destruction of nuclear weapon vehicles military bases on foreign territories be liquidated as well. This is, as we know, the very thing article 4 of the Soviet draft clearly provides for and article 9 of this draft defines minutely. The necessity of dismantling foreign bases is closely connected with that of withdrawing troops stationed on the territories of other States. Article 4 of the Soviet draft provides for the achievement of such measures, while article 10 establishes concrete means for their implementation.

The achievement of the measures contained in the Soviet draft treaty for stage I would make the outbreak of a nuclear attack in fact impossible. This would lead to a considerable improvement of the international political climate, to the development of confidence in the relations among States and among peoples. The most favourable moral, political and technical conditions would thus be created for passing on to the second stage of disarmament, namely the destruction of nuclear weapons, which already during the first stage would have been, so to speak, paralysed.

These are the main reasons which determine us to declare in favour of the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament as concerns the decisive stage, namely stage I. They are also the reasons for which why we cannot accept, in essence, the provisions regarding the first stage included in the United States plan.

The Romanian delegation had expected the United States plan, tabled about six weeks after the beginning of our Conference, to be an important contribution to the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, but I am sorry to note that the document put forward by the United States does not meet these expectations. In the first place, the United States plan shifts the centre of gravity from disarmament to control. We certainly do not conceive of disarmament without control; but the main thing is disarmament, and not control. Control is only a means of ensuring the purpose we want to achieve, namely, general and complete disarmament. The United States proposal aims -- and this is most clearly revealed by an analysis of the provisions envisaged for stage I --

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at the achievement of some partial, fragmentary measures which are entirely insufficient. These measures are meant to justify, so to speak, the claims of the United States Government as to the setting up of control over existing armaments which -- and this has been dwelt upon so many times that I do not need to mention it again -- would mean opening the door to the espionage necessary for the preparation of an armed aggression.

Secondly, we note that in the United States plan the danger of a nuclear war being unleashed is in fact maintained ad infinitum. Indeed, the United States plan envisages for stage I the maintenance of the great majority of means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets, so that the danger of a nuclear attack, instead of being liquidated, is maintained. This danger is maintained throughout stages II and III as envisaged by the United States plan. It is known that the United States plan does not limit the duration of stage III. This gives rise to serious doubts whether the United States Government contemplates at all the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war. I should like in this connexion to quote the words of a United States Senator, Mr. Humphrey, the well-known specialist on foreign affairs. Referring to the problem of the date by which general and complete disarmament would be achieved, they offer most interesting information. It is known that Lord Home said in this hall less than two months ago that according to the United States plan disarmament would take nine years to complete. But Senator Humphrey, who might be supposed to know the intention of the United States Government, said:

"In other places some have said that in nine years we would be totally disarmed. But, Mr. President, such talk is irresponsible.

There is no guarantee that even in nineteen years either we or the Soviet Union would be totally disarmed." (United States Congressional Record, 19 April 1962, page 6488)

Senator Humphrey said further -- revealing intentions of which no hint has been given to us so far in this Conference:

"But stage III -- the important one, which provides for final reduction of arms -- will come about only if certain conditions are fulfilled, and they" --

that is, these conditions --

"require the establishment of an international disarmament organization of sufficient proportions and sufficient quality so that we can be sure there will be no cheating ..." (ibid.)

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The peoples cannot agree that, hidden behind some formulations bearing the name of basic provisions for a disarmament treaty, conditions should in fact be created for the perpetuation of the danger of a nuclear war.

Thirdly, the United States plan, I repeat, does not contemplate the liquidation of all nuclear weapon vehicles, but only their reduction by 30 per cent. If we were to compare this figure with the power of destruction of the weapons which, according to experts, are today in the possession of the nuclear Powers, the conclusion could be drawn that the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war would be maintained, according to the United States plan, throughout this stage which is supposed to last for three years: that is, twice the duration of this stage in the Soviet plan.

What is more, stage I in the United States plan is to take place within three periods, out of which the first will provide for the destruction of only about 10 per cent of nuclear weapon vehicles, while new, and certainly more up-to-date, vehicles will be produced. Moreover the United States plan envisages control measures to ensure that throughout the process of disarmament agreed levels of armaments and armed forces would not be exceeded -- which, to put it in simple words, means the right of unlimited control. In other words, the United States plan proposes the setting up of control both over the 10 per cent reduction and over the remaining 90 per cent.

In our country there is an old folk story about a man who had full rights over a nail in the home of another man. This nail had been hammered into a door. Invoking the right of access to his nail, our man used to come, day and night, to hang his hat on this nail or to take the hat away -- of course passing through all the rooms of the owner of the house, troubling the poor man's entire existence, poking his nose into everything and making the man's life unbearable. The insistence applied in asking from the very beginning of disarmament, under the pretext of non-essential measures, for the right of access, control and inspection -- allegedly over only a limited domain, a small area, and at a very low percentage, and so on -- reminds me of the story of the man and his nail.

It is difficult in such circumstances not to reach the conclusion that this is an attempt to find out the location of the Soviet rocket-launching pads meant to deal a counter-blow in case of aggression, the means of production of these rockets, their chemical characteristics, and so forth.

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I would like to add that the United States plan provides for the creation of a number of international bodies, such as the international disarmament organization, the peace force, and a group of observers, which in fact would supersede the United Nations and seriously encroach upon the sovereignty of States, thus violating the principles of the Charter and, particularly, the respect due to the sovereignty of States.

According to the United Nations Charter, the Security Council is the only international body entitled to take measures with a view to maintaining international peace and security. The United States plan wants to bypass the Security Council and to elude its competence, with all the consequences -- unacceptable consequences -- this would imply. General and complete disarmament and the maintenance of peace in general cannot be promoted through measures which aim at violating the United Nations Charter, at undermining the United Nations, the main institution called upon to watch over the maintenance of peace throughout the world. Peace cannot be built upon the ruins of the sovereignty of States. Peace and disarmament can be ensured only through the co-operation of States, sovereign and equal in their sovereignty.

These are the reasons why the Romanian delegation fully agrees with the Soviet draft treaty, which, through its provisions concerning stage I, takes into account the necessity to save mankind from the scourge of a nuclear catastrophe. As was stressed a few days ago by Mr. Gheorghiu-Dej, President of the State Council of the Romanian People's Republic, in the existing conditions, when there are modern weapons of mass destruction and when a rocket-nuclear war would mean a catastrophe of incalculable consequences, we need:

"Wisdom and reasonableness in politics, great care for the strengthening of peace and for the elimination of the dangers hovering over the peoples -- and it is from the realization of this necessity that must proceed every government and every statesman with a sense of responsibility with regard to their own people and to all nations."

The Romanian delegation applies this thought also when taking its stand concerning the problem of the contents that must be given to stage I of general and complete disarmament.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I have listened with great interest to the exceptionally interesting statements this morning by the representative of Canada and the representative of India, which I will examine with great care in the verbatim record. I do not wish to reply to the very interesting remarks of the representative of India this morning, except to say that I hope we shall not take a great deal of time in discussing the question of what a certain figure should be in stage I --- because in our plan at the end of stage I the armed forces would be reduced by another one-third, so that in stage II the armed forces would be reduced to 1,050,000, or half of 2,100,000.

I think that one of the reasons why we have not achieved general and complete disarmament before is that in some cases we have tried to approach the millenium and we have tried to ask for the destruction of all weapons immediately, and in other cases we have tried to ask for too much certification at the very beginning, before any disarmament was achieved. This idea of zonal inspection is based upon the experience of some of the leading international accounting firms of the world. In order to verify the presence of all the oil in the world belonging to a certain company, or all the grain in the world or all the ships in the world, they have over the years been able to work out certain methods of spot-checking warehouses or spot-checking tankers or spot-checking inventories.

In formulating this plan we had the advice of a committee of some of the leading international accountants of the world. It is also based upon the mathematical law of probabilities. There have grown up in the world in the past forty or fifty years these various methods by which the leading mathematicians have been able to take representative samples and then have been able to deduce --- based upon the mathematical law of probabilities and again based upon the size of the samples --- that, if they were to make the same verification using the same methods, and assuming that the size of the sample is sufficient and assuming that the mathematical methods have been correct, they could draw the same mathematical deductions.

As I have said earlier, we are not putting this plan before the Conference on the ground that it is the only plan; but at the proper time we do want to go over all the reasons why it seems to us that, rather than having to make a complete inspection of a single country before embarking on any destruction of armaments, we ought at least to try to explore carefully a well thought out method, even

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though it may not be the only method, by which one can relate the actual inspection of a country's territory to the percentage of arms being destroyed. There has been an enormous amount of thinking on these subjects, and we are quite prepared to go over this matter in more detail.

We have now reached a point in our negotiations where I think it has become increasingly clear to us that we should consider again briefly just where this Conference is going and how we intend to get there.

Some of us were perhaps somewhat startled when the representative of India used a rather pungent phrase some weeks ago in characterizing our means of procedure as just "muddling along" (ENDC/PV.16, page 32). We all very much appreciated at the time, and I assume he would be the first to recognize, that by so "muddling along" through the preamble and part I of our treaty we did not lack a coherent set of goals. At the point at which the representative of India made that comment I believe he was trying to say to us in effect: "Let's not waste time on arguing procedures. Let's get on with our work in any practical way that seems best, so that we continue to talk about the substance of disarmament rather than the way we should or should not organize our agenda." In this I very much agreed with him. But as we proceed I think it would be profitable from time to time to make clear exactly where we are going. In this respect I am very much in agreement with what the representative of the United Kingdom had to say in his very forthright and helpful statement yesterday.

We have now reached a very important point in our negotiations. We will soon, I hope, be working in detail on the substantive disarmament issues in stage I of our treaty. Indeed we have already begun to discuss some of those most important measures, and the two co-Chairmen will meet the interested delegations this afternoon at 5 p.m.

One of the main problems which has arisen in the Conference thus far is the question of what type of document we are preparing. In essence this question is at the very heart of the problem of determining the best way for the Conference to proceed. Let me be clear that the United States stands committed -- I repeat, committed -- to prepare in this Conference the draft of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. It is already clear from the work we have done that the preamble as drafted up to this point constitutes the first portion of such a treaty. Part I, on which the co-Chairmen are now working, constitutes another portion of such a treaty.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

We also hold ourselves ready to conclude any other agreements which would put into effect at an early time such measure or measures of disarmament as would be acceptable to all. We do not insist that this be done. We merely see that there might be some advantage in not waiting until an entire treaty can be worked out -- which I believe, quite frankly, may be a somewhat long and difficult process -- until we put into effect any measure of disarmament.

In this sense, the position of my Government accords completely with what is so clearly stated in paragraph 8 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations of 20 September 1961. Paragraph 8 reads:

"States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme has been achieved, and efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme." (ENDC/5, page 3)

I believe that all parties here are firmly committed to working out a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The question then arises as to the precise nature of the documents submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States and their relation to our task of working out a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

The representative of the Soviet Union said the following at our twenty-sixth meeting on 24 April, in commenting on the United States outline (ENDC/30):

"At the same time it can only be regretted that the United States delegation has submitted not a draft treaty, not a document setting forth in treaty language the obligations of States in regard to general and complete disarmament, but only an outline of basic provisions." (ENDC/PV.26, page 20)

Of course Mr. Zorin would not have made a statement like the one I have just quoted if he had not believed there was already before us another draft which purported to put into treaty language the obligations of States with respect to general and complete disarmament. The other draft to which I refer is, of course, the document (ENDC/2) placed before us by the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Now I think the time has come to be quite candid about the nature of the two documents before us.

The document submitted by the delegation of the United States is an outline of basic provisions of a treaty, and it is clearly so labelled. The document submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union is also an outline of the basic provisions of a treaty. Even though it is labelled a treaty, it is not drafted in treaty language.

We do not in any way criticize the Soviet delegation for submitting an outline of a treaty. Indeed we think this is a very workmanlike way to proceed. For we do not see how any delegation, no matter how much it has studied this problem, can have enough knowledge of all the details of general and complete disarmament and its verification to submit to the Conference at this time a complete document on general and complete disarmament which could be placed on the Conference table and which representatives of all Governments here could walk up to and sign without further discussion.

We want to point out that, although the Soviet delegation and, indeed, some other delegations persist in attempting to distinguish our document from the Soviet document merely by reason of the omission from the title of the Soviet document of the word "outline", both these documents are in fact outlines.

I wish to make clear the validity of my point by a few simple illustrations. First of all, there are many provisions in the Soviet document which are drafted in language suited to an outline but simply not suited to a treaty. Permit me to draw the attention of members to page 10 of document ENDC/2, which is the Soviet outline of a treaty. In article 11, paragraph 2 we note that the delegation of the Soviet Union proposes the following:

"The reduction of the armed forces shall be carried out primarily" --
I repeat, primarily -- "through the demobilization of personnel released as a result of the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons ...".

Further down in this same paragraph we read that the reduction of armed forces shall also be carried out "chiefly" -- I repeat, "chiefly" -- by the complete disbandment of certain units, and so forth.

Further, the character of the Soviet document as an outline of a treaty is confirmed by the lack of technical definitions necessary in any treaty we may develop here. For example, article 6 of the Soviet outline concerns the

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"Elimination of military aircraft, capable of delivering nuclear weapons" (ENDC/2, page 6). Paragraph 1 of that article says that "All military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed". Members will note that it states, "All military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons". There is no limitation. All such military aircraft are to be destroyed. Now I am quite sure that the representative of the Soviet Union realizes that a nuclear weapon can be dropped from all types of aircraft, including both transport and training aircraft. Indeed, the entire air transport fleet of the Soviet Union, including all transport aircraft now used for purely civilian purposes, could be used for this purpose. I am not sure that the intent of the Soviet Union was to destroy its entire air transport fleet, without exception.

I believe these few examples of generalized language in the Soviet draft outline demonstrate clearly that, just as in the case of our own draft, the Soviet draft is an outline of a treaty and not a complete draft treaty.

Having pointed this out, let me now consider for a moment the problem of the next steps in our work. First, there seems to be agreement that we should all work towards drafting a treaty on general and complete disarmament, parts of which might be concluded in advance of the general treaty if all of us here were agreed on the measures to be included in any preliminary agreement. Secondly, I believe I have made clear that there are at least two documents before us which are treaty outlines and which could serve as guides to the problem of discussing substantive treaty provisions for the various stages. These two documents are the Soviet draft treaty -- which I am sure members will agree is an outline -- and the United States draft outline of basic provisions.

We therefore come now to the difficult question of the ways in which we might consider the question of drafting the stage I portion of our treaty. Here we have a number of substantive measures in both documents which ought, in my opinion, to be discussed measure by measure with each member of the Conference who wishes to express his views on each of these measures.

The representative of Canada, in addition to his very interesting remarks this morning, had some very wise things to say, as indeed he always has, when speaking on this question at our fifteenth meeting. I would very much like to quote a few of the things he said at that time because I think they will show

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us at least one of the roads open to our very immediate goal of the expeditious consideration of the substantive measures in stage I. Mr. Burns, in speaking of the two plans or documents before us, said:

"Now, if we take one or other of these documents and give it precedence as the framework of the agreement we are supposed to reach, we shall be in some sense prejudging the points which are really at issue, that is, as I have said, the relation in time to each other of the various acts of disarmament, the duration of time required for their accomplishment, and so forth." (ENDC/PV.15, page 45)

Then Mr. Burns went on to say that the Canadian delegation had prepared a document (ENDC/19/Rev.1) which I might say we consider very valuable in order to speed us on our way in considering the substantive portions of the treaty. In describing the use of that document, Mr. Burns said:

"With the idea that it might facilitate the task of the co-Chairmen in deciding on the order of business, a table has been drawn up showing, side by side, the related provisions of the Soviet draft treaty and the United States programme, article by article and paragraph by paragraph, so far as they can be so related. These are grouped under headings which show the main categories of measures of disarmament which have to be carried out, and also headings for related measures such as the creation of an international disarmament organization, the creation of a force under the United Nations to keep the peace, and so forth."

(ENDC/PV.15, page 46)

Just after that Mr. Burns said:

"We would suggest respectfully that, in order to meet the desires of the Committee, the co-Chairmen -- perhaps with this tabular statement as an outline of the principal matters that have to be discussed -- should decide upon an order in which the several categories of measures should be debated." (ibid., page 47)

I should like to say at this point that my delegation very much agrees with this suggestion of Mr. Burns. There is one slight proviso, however, in our agreement; that is, we would hope to see a revision shortly of document ENDC/19/Rev.1, which would set the new United States treaty outline and the Soviet document side by side in order to bring the Canadian tabular comparison up-to-date.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

In this connexion we would support and be pleased to consider any of the following means of discussing the measures in the first stage of our treaty:

(1) Use of the Canadian tabular comparison as a basis for proceeding, going through it as suggested by Mr. Burns item by item for the first stage measures;

(2) Use of the Canadian tabular comparison as a basis for proceeding, with the two co-Chairmen agreeing on which items are to be discussed in priority order, and with plenary discussion of the remaining items which cannot be agreed by the co-Chairmen on the basis of the Canadian draft;

(3) Use of the Canadian tabular comparison as a basis for proceeding, with each co-Chairman selecting in turns an item for full consideration;

(4) In addition, my delegation would be prepared to consider any other tabular comparison or list of major subject headings which might be submitted to our Committee with a view to its suitability as a basis for proceeding.

Let me be clear. There are only two major issues of procedure which really govern our position in this matter:

(a) That each member of the Conference addresses himself to the same or similar groups of measures at any one stage in our discussions in order to expedite our work; and

(b) That any measure or group of measures for stage I be fully discussed in plenary meetings by all the members of the Conference who wish to do so.

With respect to the comments of the representative of the United Kingdom on the suggestion made earlier by Mr. Krishna Menon of India, my delegation, as I think I have previously indicated, would of course be very happy to agree that it is appropriate that there should be more informal or perhaps smaller meetings, or even sub-committee meetings. I have only one suggestion. When we come to drafting and considering specific language and specific language changes, it is sometimes a little difficult to follow in an informal meeting where no verbatim record is made. It might be helpful, even in these informal meetings, to have some verbatim reporting so that members of the Conference can study the material away from the Conference table and do their own re-drafting. This would also eliminate any possibility of argument as to what precise drafting change was made or what precisely was eliminated or added.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

I merely put that forward as a tentative suggestion because it seems to me that, when trying to draft a treaty as complicated as this in an informal meeting with as many members as we have here, it would serve to forward our work if we could sometimes have a verbatim record. I put that forward as a comment, not as anything we would wish to insist upon.

With respect to our procedure for the consideration of stage I, we favour the proposal Mr. Burns made on behalf of the Canadian delegation; but I repeat that we are quite willing to consider any other variations or alternative methods of proceeding. However, in our opinion the time has come for us to move ahead forthrightly to the substance of disarmament measures, and we do believe that a concrete plan of work would do much to expedite our discussions.

I would now like to turn to some other matters which are of real importance to us. I have studied very carefully the verbatim record of Mr. Zorin's remarks yesterday morning, and many of the things he said at that time are, in my opinion, important enough to warrant a preliminary reply now. As someone who is seriously interested in working out a treaty on general and complete disarmament I find it somewhat disappointing that, no matter how much time and imagination are put into a proposal in an effort to solve the earlier problems that prevented our arriving at general and complete disarmament, the allegation is made that everything is done solely for the purpose of espionage or intelligence activities. I really do believe the time has come when we should begin to study some or all of these proposals on their merits and to see whether we can decide on the best way of getting on with disarmament, instead of labelling each of these suggestions as something that cannot be considered because it might provide some measure of intelligence. I do hope we can discuss these matters on the basis of substance instead of hearing each of them characterized as having been put forward for some ulterior purpose.

I plan to comment in rather more detail on Mr. Zorin's remarks of yesterday but I would like to comment on them briefly this morning.

Three principal areas of the United States draft treaty outline were the subject of comment by Mr. Zorin yesterday. They were: the question of verification; the question of the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage, and what Mr. Zorin chose to link with it, the so-called problem of foreign bases; and, finally, the question of the cessation of production of fissionable material for use in weapons and the transfer of large amounts of weapons-grade fissionable material to non-weapons purposes.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

First let me comment on this question of verification. As I have said, Mr. Zorin appeared to have taken no account of my detailed comments on this subject made just before he spoke yesterday. At that time I made some specific statements with respect to the verification of retained arms, and, if the Committee will bear with me for just a moment or two longer, I think this is such an important aspect of the question we are considering that it deserves repeating so that there can be no mistake about our position.

Mr. Zorin quoted yesterday from the United States draft treaty outline to the effect that the international disarmament organization would verify retained armaments (ENDC/30, page 6). He then moved to the conclusion that the United States document provided that what would be required would be --

"...it would be the duty of States not only to submit complete information about their means of delivery and the places where these are located, but also to open their territory to all kinds of investigations and to inspectors wishing to make sure of the accuracy and completeness of the information supplied, since they must provide assurance that retained armaments do not exceed agreed levels." (ENDC/PV.29, page 37-38)

I submit that nothing could be further from the truth; one need only examine the portion of the United States draft treaty outline which spells out in extenso the United States suggestions for verification of the retained armaments. It begins with article G, sub-paragraph 3.c.(1), and I will quote only from sub-paragraphs (2), (3) and (5) of that section to show just what is provided.

Sub-paragraph (2) reads as follows:

"Parties to the treaty would divide their territory into an agreed number of appropriate zones and at the beginning of each step of disarmament would submit to the international disarmament organization a declaration stating the total level of armaments, forces, and specified types of activities subject to verification within each zone. The exact location of armaments and forces within a zone would not be revealed prior to its selection for inspection." (ENDC/30, page 14).

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Sub-paragraph (3) reads in part:

"An agreed number of these zones would be progressively inspected by the international disarmament organization during stage I according to an agreed time schedule." (ibid.)

Finally, sub-paragraph (5) states:

"By the end of stage III, when all disarmament measures had been completed, inspection would have been extended to all parts of the territory of parties to the treaty." (ibid.)

Now let me quote just a short portion of my statement yesterday. I said:

"If a system of progressive zonal inspection similar to that which the United States has suggested as an illustration was adopted, then some time during the first year, perhaps at the same time as the first reduction in armaments was being made, the international disarmament organization would actually be inspecting for armaments, not in all" -- I repeat, not in all -- "of the territory of the parties to the treaty, but in only a relatively small portion of the territory, consisting of one or more of a selected number of zones." (ENDC/PV.29, page 27)

I went on to say:

"But it is clear, I submit, that as the reduction under the treaty was taking place, there would be a progressive increase in confidence as the progressive zonal inspections showed the actual armaments facilities to coincide with the amounts of armaments facilities declared to be within the particular zones." (ibid.)

It seems to me that that is very clear, and I do hope that, whatever we may eventually decide as to the merits or the demerits of this system of progressive zonal inspections, what we have submitted will at least be studied before it is denounced. We honestly have tried to meet what seems to us, at least, to be the rather intense preoccupation of the Soviet Union with this question of controls and espionage.

Now let me turn for a moment to the problem of the complete destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage. As I have pointed out and as I think Mr. Zorin agreed yesterday, the nuclear delivery vehicles in a State's military forces are a major, if indeed not the major, element of national security

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today. They are not arms of which any State that has them lightly divests itself. They are crucial for the survival of States in a world where great doubts exist as to the strength of other States and as to their intentions. To remove these vehicles as the counterweights in the current uneasy balance in which we find ourselves -- and this is our task -- will require adequate assurance that no State can retain a significant portion of its nuclear delivery vehicles after all other States have destroyed theirs.

This requires the most effective kind of control. By the standards that we have set up in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5) 100 per cent reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles in stage I, before we had gone on to anything else, would require 100 per cent assurance that that particular measure had been carried out. There is just no other way of destroying 100 per cent of all nuclear delivery vehicles without making 100 per cent inspection in stage I. To do this effectively would require a measure of control in stage I before we had gone on to stages II and III, a measure of control which I am not sure that the Soviet Union is willing to permit even at the end of stage III.

I think we ought to be clear about this question of the amount of control we would have to have in stage I if we were going to destroy all nuclear delivery vehicles in that stage.

One more facet of the Soviet proposal requires some consideration. The Soviet Union has said that the destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles must be linked in the first stage with the destruction of foreign bases. The Soviet Union and its ally Communist China constitute the largest connected land mass in the world, with almost a billion people. While we are trying to carry out general and complete disarmament, we have this problem of how we are going to maintain the peace between them and some other countries which are not socialist States and which have relatively small territories and populations of 5, 10, 12 or 15 million.

Now, in the course of general and complete disarmament all bases will have to be destroyed. We cannot destroy only foreign bases and leave all domestic bases; that is not going to solve the problem. And if we destroy all foreign bases and leave all the domestic bases, that will not solve the problem. Therefore, if we are realistic about what we face in trying to carry out general and complete disarmament, I do not think we ought to be misled by the use of the

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term "foreign bases" as against the term "all bases". We use the term "all bases", which I think is an accurate, correct and objective term. We think that all bases, whether they are foreign bases or domestic bases, no matter where they are located, should be reduced as disarmament proceeds.

Nevertheless, this link between the destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles and the destruction of foreign bases in stage I is included in the Soviet document because, and I quote from Mr. Zorin's statement yesterday:

"A foreign military base in alien territory, equipped with the power and means of aggression, cannot be regarded otherwise than as a springboard for possible aggression.

No needs or considerations of defence can justify the stationing of rocket units and the basing of air forces, rocket-carrying submarines and other naval units tens of thousands of kilometres from the national frontiers of a State." (ENDC/PV.29, page 43)

But, I submit, if all these rockets, aircraft, submarines and other ships of war are to be destroyed in the first stage, then the Soviet Union should have no fears about foreign bases for they will become useless, as will all bases for these nuclear delivery vehicles. Bases without such arms should provide no worries for the Soviet Union, as indeed Soviet bases without arms should be of no concern to us -- and we are geographically a very near neighbour to some of the major military bases of the Soviet Union.

If on the other hand the Soviet Union believes it must propose the elimination of foreign bases because it fears imbalance as a result of the drastic cuts in nuclear delivery vehicles which the Soviet Union proposes in the first stage, then I should say that we also have certain fears about imbalance. It seems to me that in order to obtain what we all want, that is, a balanced reduction of arms in carrying out general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union ought to look with favour on the carefully-balanced proposals for reduction which my delegation has submitted. If there is anything wrong with them, I would be very glad to hear what it is.

One final consideration before I conclude my remarks today. Mr. Zorin said yesterday that the United States proposal for a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons and the consequent transfer of a sizeable amount of such material to non-weapons purposes was a mere sham to gain control over the atomic industry of the Soviet Union. But I submit that Mr. Zorin cannot have read the United States proposal correctly. For if the atomic industry

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stops producing fissionable material for use in weapons, what is there left to discover about a shut-down industry? When an industry is shut down, what espionage could take place if all that the international disarmament organization inspectors verified was that the atomic plants had ceased their production of weapons-grade fissionable material? Indeed, the Soviet Union itself has offered to allow control of other armaments plants when they cease production (ENDC/2, article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2, page 10). After hearing Mr. Zorin's statement of yesterday, I very much hope that the Soviet Union is not now retreating from those proposals to which I have referred.

Secondly, Mr. Zorin has said that the proposal for a cut-off of production of fissionable materials is unacceptable to him because it does not involve disarmament. But I submit that Mr. Zorin has forgotten that the United States proposes to transfer some fifty metric tons of fissionable material for use in weapons to non-weapons purposes. If Mr. Zorin does not believe that 50 metric tons is a large enough quantity to constitute real disarmament, then let him propose another figure for us to consider. I submit it is not very constructive simply to say that 50 metric tons is not enough. We are open-minded on this subject and would like to do as much as we can in the first stage to contain and reduce the nuclear threat.

Before I close, let me say that Mr. Zorin also touched yesterday on the difficult problem of production during stage I, and upon some other issues, and I will want to address myself to these questions at a subsequent meeting.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Today so much of importance has been said on a number of questions that I naturally do not propose in the time that remains to deal with the substance of the numerous questions which have been brought up today by many speakers. We shall revert to these questions later in our discussions.

I wish to use the remaining time merely to reply to certain questions raised by the representatives of Canada and the United States.

The representative of Canada has spoken today about the advantage of a partial reduction, a percentage reduction in delivery vehicles and has said that our proposal for the 100 per cent reduction or, more correctly, the 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage is inadequate or insufficiently convincing.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

I do not intend to go into all the arguments he used in this connexion or into the particular observations he has made on the subject. But I should like to point out to all representatives that when he spoke of the danger of surprise attack and stated that this danger is an obstacle to the destruction of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage, the complete illogicality of his argument was, I think, apparent to everyone. I say this because in fact, if nuclear weapon delivery vehicles are reduced by 10 or 30 per cent, the risk of surprise attack in these circumstances will obviously be ten or at least three times greater than if all delivery vehicles were eliminated. This conclusion is absolutely logical. If you reduce delivery vehicles by 10 per cent, 90 per cent of delivery vehicles remain, which means that, to say the least, the possibility of an attack will be ten times greater than if you reduce delivery vehicles by 100 per cent, when you actually eliminate the possibility of attack.

That is why I could not understand how such an inference could be made. Why will our proposal for the 100 per cent reduction of delivery vehicles increase the risk of surprise attack? This is something I cannot understand.

It seems to me that all Mr. Burns' arguments about the impossibility of verifying whether or not all delivery vehicles have really been eliminated also apply if delivery vehicles are reduced by 10 per cent. The only difference is, however, that the likelihood of a violation will be less with a reduction of 100 per cent than with one of 10 per cent. This, too, is quite obvious to everyone, because 90 per cent of the vehicles will still be left and in these circumstances there is, of course, a greater likelihood of a proportion of the vehicles being concealed and not eliminated than if we were to take the course of reducing them by 100 per cent and verifying this 100 per cent reduction. We do not refuse to agree to verification of 100 per cent elimination.

Mr. Dean said he is not sure that the Soviet Union is willing to permit 100 per cent verification even at the end of disarmament. But we tell you that if you agree to 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, we will agree to 100 per cent control over this. Why, then, do you not believe us? Accept the proposal for the 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and we will agree to 100 per cent verification of this elimination of these types of arms. Why do you not believe us? We are telling you this officially. Yet even with 100 per cent verification of the 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, Mr. Burns for some reason asks whether the risk of surprise attack will not be increased.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

I think such a question and such misgivings are completely artificial. Everyone has far greater misgivings if you say that 10 per cent of delivery vehicles are to be eliminated, i.e. if 90 per cent of delivery vehicles remain. Of course, the danger of surprise attack in these circumstances is increased tens of times; this is quite obvious to everyone. It is, incidentally, for this very reason that we say that any percentage reduction in delivery vehicles involves the risk of an increased danger of surprise attack during the process of reduction.

This is in fact the case. We maintain that this is so particularly as you propose to reduce delivery vehicles by 10 per cent but to establish 100 per cent control. This is the crux of the matter. If you reduce delivery vehicles by 10 per cent but wish to establish control over the remaining 90 per cent, is there any guarantee that, after having established control over the remaining 90 per cent of delivery vehicles and having verified where these 90 per cent are, you will not then say that you do not intend to go on disarming, that you need nothing further and propose to tear up the disarmament treaty. This is all the more likely in view of the fact that your draft treaty, the United States draft treaty, states quite specifically that the transition from one stage to another will depend on the consent of any permanent member of the Control Council and the decision of the Security Council.

In our draft treaty we laid down that unanimity will not be required in the international disarmament organization. This is what we laid down; in other words, there will be no veto in the organization. But your draft treaty states that the transition from one stage to another will depend not only on the decision of the international disarmament organization, but also on the decision of the Security Council. In other words, you are now asking for a veto. Over what? The transition from one stage to another.

When we ask for a veto for the purpose of ensuring that no armed force is used against any other State without the consent of the permanent members of the Security Council, you consider it unjustified. But when you ask for a veto over the continuation of the disarmament process, over the transition from one stage to another, and take the line that each member of the Security Council can decide the question of whether or not to pass on to the next stage, you consider it justified. But is it really justified?

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

I think that everyone will understand that your position in this matter is absolutely unjustified. It merely goes to show that you simply do not want a disarmament process that is continuous and safeguarded from beginning to end, but want to have the possibility of halting the disarmament process at any stage. This is what you want. In these circumstances, how can you expect us to be able to agree to eliminating 10 per cent of delivery vehicles and giving you the opportunity of verifying 90 per cent, when your representative in the Security Council can then say, after the completion of the first stage of disarmament, that he does not wish to pass on to the next stage. But can such a treaty really be signed? For you yourselves must understand that this is an absolutely impossible situation. Neither the Soviet Union nor any other country can agree to a treaty on general and complete disarmament if it is not sure that disarmament, once begun, will be brought to a conclusion.

You yourself, Mr. Dean, have said today that the elimination of delivery vehicles is a major, if not the major, element of any State's national security. Why then do you call for a reduction of 10 or 30 per cent in delivery vehicles and the establishment of control over all the remainder and, after that, give any member of the Security Council the right to halt the disarmament process at any stage he chooses? Under such a system there can, of course, be no real disarmament. No one will agree to such disarmament. This is why we insist that if we are to proceed to general and complete disarmament, we must do so at once by taking radical and decisive measures within the shortest possible time.

We in fact propose the total elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage, after which the danger of surprise attack will virtually have been removed so far as nuclear arms are concerned. We also propose that there should simultaneously be a substantial reduction in conventional armed forces in order also to eliminate the risk of conflict between such forces.

We consider that this is a genuinely practical course towards general and complete disarmament because, after the 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, everyone will breathe freely, as the danger of direct military conflict, at least with nuclear weapons, will immediately be removed in all countries. This is a genuinely practical and radical course. The course which you propose is, of course, impractical and does not establish conditions favourable to general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

These are my observations on Mr. Burns' statement and also in part on the questions which Mr. Dean raised in connexion with our plan.

The second matter I wish to discuss is our future work. Mr. Dean raised this question again today and I must frankly say that I was most surprised at this. Why has this question been raised? In what context has it been raised? Much has been said on this question but, in my opinion, it turns on two basic points.

The first point is as follows. Mr. Dean said today that the United States considers that the major task is the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, that it regards this as its main task. But at the same time he said that the United States holds itself ready to conclude any other agreements, without waiting until an entire treaty can be worked out, and he referred in this connexion to point 8 of the Agreed Principles.

What does this mean? Translated into simple language, its meaning is this. The United States has concerned itself with the preparation of a draft treaty because there is no alternative. There is a General Assembly resolution on the preparation of a treaty; a draft treaty has been submitted by the Soviet Union. The United States was also compelled to submit a draft outline of a treaty, but it does not really believe in the possibility of preparing a draft treaty acceptable to itself. I myself have a few doubts; I, too, need not always believe everything that is said. We have the impression that the United States does not want such a treaty. We have this impression because, during the month and a half of our discussions, we have already had evidence of its attitude even in the documents which have been issued to all representatives and which we have been discussing. You remember that at the very beginning of our work, during the discussion of the preamble, the United States objected to the idea of a preamble to a specific treaty. It talked of some unspecified treaty. All these proposed changes were later excluded, but only after some conflict and discussion.

As you know, the preamble ends with a clause to the effect that the States have resolved or agreed to conclude the draft treaty the text of which follows. The United States also objected to making that reference. It was against referring to the specific treaty the text of which was to follow; but this objection was subsequently overcome. We are very glad that it was overcome. But although all these points of obscurity and doubt have been removed from the

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preamble, the United States, as we see, is still thinking in terms of "any other agreements" which would be concluded without waiting until a treaty has been worked out. What are these "other agreements"? They relate to the partial disarmament measures, the separate measures, which the United States has long been advocating. They relate to the separate measures which Mr. Rusk proposed at the very beginning of the Conference. What were these measures? They were the transfer of fifty tons of fissionable materials to non-weapons purposes, certain measures to prevent surprise attack, etc. These are some of the measures which the United States put forward as separate measures. It would have liked these measures to be discussed and worked out separately, without waiting for the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

After a long interval, Mr. Dean has reverted to this idea today, when we have moved on to a discussion of the actual substance of the treaty, to the first stage of the disarmament treaty. Why do you revert to this question? Why do you not wish to study the first stage of the treaty in concrete terms and see what action can be taken, what we can agree upon in the first stage; we can then pass on to the second stage and then to the third. For some reason you now refer to "any other agreements", although you say that the United States is in favour of drafting this treaty on general and complete disarmament. If you are really in favour of drafting a treaty, let us continue our work on it, following the same course as heretofore, which has, in my view, been generally sound and has not given rise to any doubts. I think no useful purpose is served by raising the question of any other agreements at the present time. I would say that this is harmful because it once again diverts us from the drafting of the basic document: the treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Since you introduced the subject of other agreements in speaking just now, I would point out that we have such an agreement before us at the present time -- the declaration on the prohibition of war propaganda. Let us adopt such an agreement. This now depends entirely on you. After the meeting we held at the end of the week it became clear that it now depends solely on the United States whether or not such a declaration is adopted as a separate agreement. The representative of the United States told us yesterday that he intends to give us his views tomorrow on what action should be taken in regard to this declaration. We will, of course, gladly discuss this question with our United States colleague.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

If by "any other agreements" you mean agreements of this type, we are prepared to discuss them, because this does not divert us from the task of general and complete disarmament and does not involve the separate treatment of a problem which is covered by the treaty on general and complete disarmament itself. We are prepared to work on such agreements. But if your idea is to consider separate disarmament measures outside the context of the treaty, we believe that this is not helpful but harmful.

The second point, which is the crux of the problem raised by Mr. Dean today, is the question of our future procedure in dealing with the treaty. The plan proposed by the Canadian representative at an earlier meeting of our Committee has again been brought out. It has been said that the outline submitted by Mr. Burns will now be revised and redrafted and will be submitted to us in a form which takes account of the new United States draft treaty.

I have already said that any delegation can of course submit, both for its own convenience and in order to facilitate the work of other delegations, working documents for the purpose of comparing the different positions and plans that have been laid before us. We can thank Mr. Burns for the work he has already done and proposes to do in the future with a view to making comparison of the various plans easier for us. But I see no reason why we should revise our procedure of work on that account. Why should we do this? After all, we are now discussing concrete documents: the Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union and now the Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty submitted by the United States.

There is a first stage in our proposal, and there is a first stage in the United States proposal. Let us discuss the first stage. Why do we need comparative tables? What do we need them for? We need them only as working material, as working documents to facilitate our own examination of all parts of these plans. But it is now clear to everyone, as the representative of India has indicated, that the main issues must be settled; in the case of the first stage we must decide which disarmament measures are to be included in it. Our plan provides for specific measures -- the complete elimination of the means of delivery, the reduction of armed forces to 1,700,000 men, then the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops from alien territories. There you have four concrete disarmament measures. The United States proposes

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other measures -- a reduction by 30 per cent of armaments in agreed categories, then the transfer of fifty tons of fissionable materials to non-weapons purposes and the reduction of armed forces to 2,100,000 men. These are three specific proposals by the United States. So why do we need comparative tables? Which measures will be the most appropriate to adopt? What are the arguments and reasons in favour of this measure or that measure? We are already beginning to consider such matters. Very interesting and important ideas are being put forward. At the same time views are being expressed on how to ensure control over the implementation of these measures. These, too, we will gladly listen to.

After we have exchanged opinions on the first stage, we can meet informally and discuss the points on which we can agree, the measures we can adopt jointly and the measures of control that can be taken in this connexion. We will go through the first stage in this way, go on to deal with the second stage and then proceed to the third stage. Then we shall have a clear picture of the general disarmament plan we are adopting, of the sequence of measures, of the questions on which we have agreement and those on which we do not.

We shall decide how to deal with the questions on which we do not have agreement, when and in what order we shall return to them. It seems to me that this is a perfectly normal procedure and is the one which we have in fact hitherto followed. It is, after all, how we have dealt with the preamble and with the first part of the treaty. Why cannot we follow the same procedure with the remaining parts of the treaty? I see no reason at all why we cannot do so. I suspect that there is a desire to go into all the technical details of the different types and categories of armaments during the discussion of the first stage. If this is what you have in mind, I will tell you at once that this is an unprofitable exercise. Is there any point in our undertaking a detailed discussion of an individual type of armament when you are simply not prepared to destroy the type of armament concerned? In such circumstances is there any point in our discussing what types and categories of armaments should be destroyed? You are not prepared to destroy these types of armaments at all. Why, therefore, should we discuss the matter? And this applies to all individual categories of armaments.

Is it first necessary to decide what types of armaments you wish to destroy and in what order? Let us then decide this question. We will discuss it and

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then reach some kind of conclusion. . If we can reach agreement on all this, we can then embark on a detailed discussion of all the technical aspects of implementation. To discuss these questions at an earlier stage is completely unrealistic and altogether unsound. We might then get bogged down in these technical details of the first stage and not get on to the second and third stages at all. But we have a specific mandate. We must submit our first report by 1 June, informing the General Assembly of the action we have taken to give effect to its resolution on the preparation of treaty on general and complete disarmament. But if we get bogged down already in the individual, separate issues arising in the first stage, we will never reach the third stage. At any rate, we will not do so this year. I believe this to be the wrong course. I apologize for detaining representatives so long, but I thought it essential to discuss this matter today in view of the ideas on our further procedure of work that were put forward today, and as I would like all representatives to reflect on these matters.

If we continue our discussion of these questions to-morrow, I shall have an opportunity of commenting more fully on certain views expressed at the last meeting by the representative of the United Kingdom and at the present meeting by the representatives of the United States, Canada and India. I shall return to these questions to-morrow if this is possible, but today I would ask you to give some consideration to our views on the Committee's further work. It seems to me that nothing need be changed. We should proceed as we have done before, working on the two specific documents which are before us. This seems to me to be the only correct course. I regret that Mr. Dean and myself were obliged to spend a certain amount of time discussing a question with which I do not think we are concerned. There are specific documents before us, and we are discussing these documents. Let us therefore discuss them properly.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I made my statement today in order to advance our primary task of drafting a treaty on general and complete disarmament. I do not think there is any disagreement here that that is our primary task. I am sorry that the representative of the Soviet Union is so pessimistic, and indeed so suspicious of my motives. I merely urge that he read what I said today. I am afraid that he is now reading into what I said far more than I intended. I intended only to advance our work on the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): If no other representatives wish to speak, I will read out the draft of the communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its thirtieth meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. A.F. Hassan, representative of the United Arab Republic.

"A statement was made by U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations. Statements were also made by the representatives of Canada, India, Romania, the United States and the Soviet Union.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 4 May 1962, at 10 a.m. "

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): According to the interpretation, reference is made to the fact that we heard the Secretary-General of the United Nations. If this is so, I should like to introduce an amendment. We cannot, of course, describe U Thant as Secretary-General. We must call him "Acting Secretary-General", as was decided by the General Assembly. Perhaps the interpretation was incorrect.

The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): If there are no further remarks, that part of the communique will read as follows:

"A statement was made by U Thant, Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations."

The communique, as amended, was adopted.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.